{{Your Name}}  
{{Your address}}   
{{Contact information}}

{{Date}}

{{Name Address of elected official}}

Dear {{Name of official}},

You and your office have embraced social media as a crucial means of communicating and interacting with your constituents and the public. As a constituent of yours, I was once able to take advantage of this medium to express my views on issues to you and your staff—but I was blocked from viewing and replying to posts by your official [[ Select one Twitter/Facebook ]] account at [[ Insert Official Page Name, i.e, “John Smith’s Facebook Page,” and URL here ]] on or about [[ Insert exact or approximate date here ]] after I challenged the position you took on [name the issue(s)]. The comments I posted prior to you blocking me did not violate any of the terms of the Comment Policy on your official [[ Select one Twitter/Facebook ]] account.

This restriction, as several federal courts have recently held, violates my right to free speech under the First Amendment. This restriction is similarly violative of rights guaranteed under the Kansas Constitution to instruct representatives, petition government, and publish sentiments on all subjects.[[1]](#footnote-1). Accordingly, the law requires that you immediately cease this unconstitutional action and restore without delay my access to your social media posts and page.

As a general matter, blocking users from accessing your official social media pages likely violates the First Amendment. While elected officials have a right to “exercise editorial control over speech and speakers” on their purely personal social media platforms, they generally do not have the right to block constituents from government social media pages, or to block individuals from responding to specific posts on their personal pages if the official was purporting to exercise their authority as an elected official in that post.[[2]](#footnote-2)

While your [[ Select one: Twitter/Facebook ]] account is privately owned, you routinely discuss governmental matters such as legislation, policies, and votes on your page. Therefore the First Amendment applies. For example, you used the account to discuss [[ insert examples of prior posts on government matters or business related to the official’s position or any other indications the social media account is for official business]]. Like the county official in *Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors*,[[3]](#footnote-3) you (1) made “efforts to swathe [your [[ Select one Twitter/Facebook ]] ] page in the trappings of your offices” by prominently displaying your official title, website, and other contact information on it; (2) have been “us[ing] it as a tool of governance” by engaging your constituents and keeping them informed with frequent links and commentaries; and (3) have devoted “[government] resources to support[ing]” and maintaining the [[ Select one Twitter/Facebook ]] page.[[4]](#footnote-4) In July 2019, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the lower court ruling in *Knight*, reaffirming that “the President violated the First Amendment when he used the blocking function to exclude the Individual Plaintiffs because of their disfavored speech.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

At the state level, in August 2018 a federal judge in Maine dismissed an attempt by former Gov. Paul LePage to halt a lawsuit brought by two constituents banned from his “Paul LePage, Maine’s Governor” Facebook page.[[6]](#footnote-6) The judge noted that the governor’s page “is linked to the Governor’s blog on his government site, it is deemed his “official” page in the “About” section of his page, and when asked, his office has classified it as his official Facebook page.”[[7]](#footnote-7)

Your actions are comparable to the officials in the Davison and Leuthy cases. You “acted under color of state law,”[[8]](#footnote-8) with the “imprimatur of governmental connection and authority,”[[9]](#footnote-9) in both running your [[ Select one: Twitter/Facebook ]] account and banning me from viewing it.[[10]](#footnote-10)

And since the part of your social media account to which I am demanding access is not government speech, the First Amendment is fully applicable to this situation. While the content of your social media posts and your account’s timeline are government speech and thus exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, the “‘interactive space’ associated with each [post] in which other users may directly interact with [its] content” (i.e., the comments section or replies) is not.[[11]](#footnote-11) It does not bear any of the hallmarks of government speech as (1) you have not “long” used social media to “convey [official] messages”; (2) *my* comments and replies in the “interactive space” are not—indeed, cannot—be “closely identified in the public mind” with *your* office; and (3) you do not “maintain[] direct control over the messages conveyed” in my comments.[[12]](#footnote-12) Your regulation of the “interactive space” associated with your social media posts, therefore, must be consistent with the First Amendment.

[[ Note: Use this space to write a personal statement on why you value the free exchange of ideas with your elected lawmakers, and why being denied that opportunity is harmful to you and the issues you care about. ]]

Blocking me from that interactive space solely due to the content of my critical comments violates the First Amendment. Federal courts that have considered the issue did not agree on the proper forum[[13]](#footnote-13) classification for official social media accounts,[[14]](#footnote-14) however they were unanimous in concluding that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible regardless of the type of forum.[[15]](#footnote-15) Because your “suppression of [my] critical commentary regarding [my] elected official[] is the natural form of viewpoint discrimination,”[[16]](#footnote-16) it violates the First Amendment.

This same analysis holds true in Kansas state courts which have confirmed that content-based speech (e.g., forum restriction of *all* political speech) in public forums may only be restricted when it is “narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.”[[17]](#footnote-17) Kansas courts held that in nonpublic forums, “[t]he State may restrict speech . . . as long as: (1) the restriction is reasonable; and (2) the restriction is viewpoint neutral, i.e., the State is not suppressing speech merely because of opposition to the speaker’s viewpoint.”[[18]](#footnote-18) In this instance, blocking me from your official [[ Select one Twitter/Facebook ]] page is clear viewpoint discrimination which is impermissible under Kansas law, regardless of forum designation.

Today, “the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general”—and “social media in particular”—are “the most importance places . . . for the exchange of views.”[[19]](#footnote-19) Among these views, as the Supreme Court has for decades emphasized, “[p]olitical speech . . . is ‘at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”[[20]](#footnote-20) These “First Amendment protections for free speech extend to internet communications.”[[21]](#footnote-21) And this protection applies whether or not the views were expressed in a refined manner.[[22]](#footnote-22) None of the communication I exhibited on your [[ Select one Twitter/Facebook ]] meets this high bar allowing government to withhold rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.

For these reasons, I demand that you and your staff immediately restore my unrestricted ability to view and interact with your [[ Select one: Twitter/Facebook ]] posts, not only to fulfil your duties as my elected representative to hear my views, critical or not, but also to fulfil your duties as a public servant to uphold the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution.

Sincerely,

{{SIGNATURE}}

{{Your name}}

1. Kan Const. B. of R. §§ 3, 11 (LexisNexis 2016).  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Lindke v. Freed*, 601 U.S. 187, 188 (2024).   
    [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 26 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Id.* at 713–14; *see also* *Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump*, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (concluding that because, *inter alia*, President Trump’s Twitter account is presented as presidential and is used for official business, his control over it “is governmental in nature”); *Garnier v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.*, No. 17-cv-2215-W (JLB), 2018 WL 2357151, at \*3 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2018).  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,* No. 1:17-cv-5205 (S.D.N.Y.), No. 18-1691 (2d Cir.).  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Leuthy et al v. LePage*,No. 1:17-cv-00296-JAW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146894 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2018).  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *Id.* at \*10–11.  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Davison*, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 714.  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Leuthy*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146894 at \*23.  
    [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. In *Knight*, the court declined to analyze the state action requirement “separately” when the “government control-or-ownership requirement” is satisfied. 302 F. Supp. 3d at 568.  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Knight*, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566, 572.  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Matal v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) (citation omitted); *see also* *Knight*, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572; *Price v. City of New York*, 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at \*14 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The Supreme Court has recognized three types of fora—“traditional public forum,” “public forum by designation,” and “nonpublic forum”—that afford different degrees of constitutional protection to expressive activities. *Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund*, 473 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1985).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *See* *Knight*, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (classifying the “interactive space” associated with President Trump’s tweets as “a designated public forum); *Davison*, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 716 (refusing to “pass on the [classification] issue”); *Price*, 2018 WL 3117507, at \*15–16 (declining to “resolve the [classification] issue” but observing that defendant “City’s official Twitter pages share many characteristics of public forums”).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *See* *Knight*, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575 n.22 (viewpoint discrimination is “impermissible ‘regardless of how the property is categorized under forum doctrine.’” (citation omitted)); *Davison*, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 717 (“Viewpoint discrimination is ‘prohibited in all forums.’” (citation omitted)); *Price*, 2018 WL 3117507, at \*16 (“[V]iewpoint discrimination that results in the intentional, targeted expulsion of individuals from [any type of forum] violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”); *see also* *Matal*, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (stating that “‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden” in government-created fora).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Davison*, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 717  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *State v. Bartell*, 2019 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 90, at \*22 (2019) (citing *Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n*, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Bartell*, 2019 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 90, at \*22–23 (citing *Perry*, 460 U.S. at 46; *Lower v. Board of Dir. of Haskell Cty. Cemetery Dist.*, 274 Kan. 735, 746, 56 P.3d 235 (2002)).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Packingham v. North Carolina*, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (citation omitted).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Morse v. Frederick*, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (quoting *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion)); *see also* *Snyder v. Phelps*, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011); *Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y.*, 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997); *Friedman v. Rogers*, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n.10 (1979); *Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (plurality opinion) (quoting *First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *State v. Bell*, 2017 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 959, at \*7 (2017) (citing *Reno v. ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *See* *Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“[O]ne man’s vulgarity is another lyric.”). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)